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BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDISCOVERING EQUITABLE
DISCRETION IN TRADEMARK CASES
by
Mark P. McKenna
Courts in recent years have increasingly made blunt use of their equitable
powers in trademark cases. Rather than limiting the scope of injunctive
relief so as to protect the interests of a mark owner while respecting the
legitimate interests of third parties and of consumers, courts in most cases
have viewed injunctive relief in binary terms. This is unfortunate,
because greater willingness to tailor injunctive relief could go a long way
to mitigating some of the most pernicious effects of trademark law's
modern expansion. This Essay urges courts to reverse this trend towards
crude injunctive relief and to re-embrace their equitable discretion as a
means of achieving greater balance in the trademark system.
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I. AN OLD SAGA: TRADITIONAL USE OF
EQUITABLE DISCRETION
Joseph L. Hall began selling fire and burglar-proof safes in 1847.
Hall's company, "Hall's Safe & Lock Company," was located in
Cincinnati, Ohio, but the company was very successful and its business
. Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. @ 2010 Mark P. McKenna.
Thanks to Stacey Dogan, David McGowan, Joe Miller, and the participants in the
Lewis & Clark Law School Fall Forum on Intellectual Property Remedies for helpful
feedback.
Hall's Safe Co. v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 146 F. 37, 38 (6th Cir. 1906),
modified and affd, Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554
(1908). The following facts are taken from the Sixth Circuit's opinion unless
otherwise indicated.
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extended throughout the United States and into foreign countries. Its
safes were known as "Hall's Safes" and "Hall's Standard Safes," and the
2
safes had a good reputation .
Joseph Hall died in March of 1889, leaving the company to his sons,
Edward, William, and Charles, who continued the business under the
same name. On May 4, 1892, however, the sons sold the assets of their
father's company, including its "real estate and leasehold interests, tools,
machinery, fixtures, merchandise, trade-marks and good will" to a New
Jersey company called the Herring-Hall-Marvin Company. The sons
agreed to dissolve Hall's Safe & Lock Company and agreed the company
would not in the future "engage or continue in said business." After the
sale, Edward and William Hall became stockholders, directors, and,
respectivel y, president and treasurer, of the Herring-Hall-Marvin
Company.T
As a condition of their new positions with the Herring-Hall-Marvin
Company, Edward and William Hall each agreed to the following
stipulation:
And in consideration as aforesaid, I [Edward or William Hall] do
hereby covenant, promise, and agree that I will not, so long as the
Herring-Hall-Marvin Company may desire to retain my services as
above, engage, either in the state of Ohio, or in the state of New
Jersey, or in any of the states east of the Mississippi river, in the
business of manufacturing, selling, buying, or dealing in fire or
burglar proof vaults and safes, or in any business or occupation
such as the said corporation known as the Hall's Safe & Lock
Company has heretofore been engaged in, or such as the Herring-
Hall-Marvin Company is authorized or impowered [sic] to engage
in, or in any other business which will or may compete or interfere
in any manner with the business of the said Herring-Hall-Marvin
Company. 5
But this marriage turned out not to be a happy one, and Edward and
William Hall were forced out of their positions with Herring-Hall-Marvin
in relatively short order. Undaunted, the Hall brothers promply started a
new corporation with the name 'Hall's Safe Company' and went into the
business of manufacturing and selling safes.6 The Herring-Hall-Marvin
Company was not amused, and it filed a lawsuit seeking to restrain the
brothers' new company from carrying on its business under the Hall's
Safe Company name "or any name calculated to make purchasers believe
that they are dealing with the establishment founded by Joseph L. Hall,
2Hall's Safe Co., 146 F. at 38.
SId.
4id.
5Id. at 38-39.
6 Id. at 39.
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or with the plaintiff, and also to enjoin them from advertising or marking
their product as Hall's Safes."'
This proved to be a relatively hard case because the court did not
believe the Halls had given up the right to do business under the Hall
name when they sold the original Hall's Safe & Lock Company to
Herring-Hall-Marvin Company. Consequently, while Herring-Hall-
Marvin Company had the right to use the name "Hall" 9by way of
succession, it did not have an exclusive right to use the name . The court
therefore aimed to protect both parties' legitimate interests by allowing
the sons to use the Hall name but preventing source confusion by
enjoining:
[Ulse of the name Hall, either alone or in combination, in
corporate name, on safes, or in advertisements, unless
accompanied by information that the defendant is not the original
Hall's Safe and Lock Company or its successor, or, as the case may
be, that the article is not the product of the last named company or
its successors.'
I focus on this old case not because it was especially important in the
development of trademark law. In fact it is precisely the typicality of
Herring-Hall-Marvin that is important here. For that case reflects a
willingness to limit the scope of injunctive relief that is largely absent
from modemn cases. Courts in a variety of cases in the traditional
trademark era exercised their equitable discretion to shape injunctive
relief in order to protect a mark owner's legitimate interests while leaving
room for the defendant to operate. Indeed some courts went to
extraordinary lengths in this regard. In WR. Speare Co. v. Speare," for
example, the court directed entry of:
[A] decree prohibiting the [defendant] ... from using the word
"Speare" as the name, or part of the name, of their business as
undertakers, or in advertisements, telephone directories, signs, or
statements of any nature, unless accompanied by the words "neither
Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. at 557. The story was actually a bit more
complicated. Herring-Hall-Marvin originally filed the suit, complaining that the Hall's
Safe Company "was infringing its trade and good will, and praying for an injunction."
Hall's Safe Co., 146 F. at 39. 'While that suit was pending the Herring-Hall-Marvin
Company became insolvent, and a receiver was appointed. A new corporation was
organized in New Jersey," and all of the Herring-Hall-Mar-vin Company's assets were
acquired by the New Jersey Company, including "all the real estate, personal
property, manufacturing plant, tools, machinery, merchandise, assets, franchises,
property, and good will of the Herring-Hall-Marvin Company." Id. During the
insolvency and reorganization the case originally filed by Herring-Hall-Marvin was
dismissed on a ground not now material, but without prejudice, and the New Jersey
thereafter filed a new complaint. Id. So the case ultimately was prosecuted by
Herring-Hall-Marvin's successor in interest.
' Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. at 557.
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 560.
"265 F. 876 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
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the successors of, nor connected with, the original W. R. Speare
establishment," in appropriate juxtaposition therewith, and in
conspicuous letters, and from making any statement, oral or
otherwise, that they or any one of them is continuing the original
business formerly done by W. R. Speare under that name at 940 F
street, N. W., and now carried on by the defendants, or that they
have any privity or connection by succession, inheritance, or
otherwise, with said business, or that said original business is no
longer in existence or is not being continued by the plaintiff
herein '.
Courts also were inclined to craft detailed prophylactic injunctions
for the purpose of protecting against confusion that might result from a
defendant's legitimate use of a generic term. In DuPont Cellophane Co. v.
Waxed Products Co.,'13 for example, the court found the term "cellophane"
generic and therefore allowed the defendant to continue filling orders
for cellophane with its own product.14 Nevertheless, because DuPont's
use of "cellophane" had been widely publicized, in order to avoid source
confusion the court required the defendant to state that the product it
was selling was "Sylvania cellophane or the cellophane of whomsoever
may be the maker," and to prefix the 15word cellophane with the maker's
name as a possessive in its advertising.
Similarly, in Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co.,'6 the Court found
that, through general use of the term by numerous proprietors of
Hungarian bitter waters, "Hunyadi" had become public property in the
Kingdom of Hungary and the defendant therefore had a leimate basis
for using the name "Hunyadi Matyas" for its bitter waters. The Court
did, however, enjoin the defendant's use of bottles and labels the Court
believed resembled Saxlehner's. Notably, the court expressly rejected the
defendant's claim that it had adequately distinguished its product by
including on its bottles a red seal containing the words: "Ask for the Seal
brand. This label has been adopted to protect the public from imitation
and as a guarantee of the genuineness of the Hunyadi Matyas Water
imported solely by Eisner and Mendelson Co., New York.""8
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., '9 the plaintiff
sought to enforce rights in the Singer name and in the shape of its
sewing machines, which was the subject of an expired patent. The Court
rejected Singer's claims with respect to the shape of its machines on the
ground that "the right to make the machine in the form in which it was
2Id. at 880.
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936).
'~Id. at 82. While the court does not use the term "generic" in its opinion, the
the court expresses the concept of genericness by stating that the term cellophane
"ordinarily signifie[d] the cellulose product." Id.
15 Id.
'6 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
17 Id. at 36.
1Id. at 40-41.
'~163 U.S. 169 (1896).
540 Vol. 14:2
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constructed during the patent" passes to the public on termination of the
patent.2 The defendant's right to use the Singer name then was simply a
matter of making competition in the post-patent period meaningful, for
use of the name "was essentially necessary to vest the public with the full
enjoyment of that which had become theirs by the disappearance of the
monopoly.",2' Consequently, the defendant was entitled to make its
machines in the same shape as Singer's and to designate them "Singer"
machines. It was not, however, entitled to mislead consumers about the
source of its products. 2 Thus, in the Court's view, the defendant would
have escaped all liability if it had "marked its machines with a sufficiently
prominent disclosure of the actual source of manufacture," and if its
advertisements "adequately disclose Ed] the true source of [the
defendant's] goods. 2
This suggestion was consistent with cases like Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co.,2 in which the court found the claimed mark (in that case
"Shredded Wheat") generic and declined to enter any injunctive relief
because the defendant took care to delineate clearly the source of its
products. Kellogg differentiated its cereal biscuits by making them in a
different size than National Biscuit and by prominently displaying the
Kellogg name on its packaging." In so doing, Kellogg showed that, while
it surely was trying to capture some of National Biscuit's market share, it
was not trying to deceive National Biscuit's consumers about the source
26
of its shredded wheat. And that was all that was required .
Brown Chemical Co. v. Meer~ strikes the same note. In that case the
Court rejected the plaintiffs claim to exclusive rights in the term "Iron
Bitters" for medicine preparations, holding the term "indicative of the
ingredients, characteristics and purposes of the plaintiffs preparation. 2
Meyer therefore had a right to use "Iron Bitters" for his competitive
product.29 Moreover, as the defendant's firm employed someone who
also had the surname of Brown, he had the right to use the name
"'Brown's Iron Bitters' . . .. unless he uselid] them in such connection
with other words or devices as to operate as a deception upon the
public.,30 Since the defendant's bottles differed in size and shape from
the plaintiff's and their "labels and cartons [were] so dissimilar in color,
design and detail that no intelligent person would be likely to purchase
2Id. at 185-86.
21 id.
22 Id. at 187, 200-01.
"5 David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium,
30 Wm. MrrcHELL L. Rrv. 1659, 1664 (2004).
24 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
"Id. at 120-22.
26 id.
2139 U.S. 540 (1891).
28 Id. at 542.
'" Id.at57
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either under the impression that he was purchasing the other," no relief
was appropniate."
These are isolated examples, and some of them seem like special
cases. Courts have, for example, long expressed reluctance to prevent
12
merchants from using their own names in commerce , and several of the
cases could be explained on that basis. But it would be a mistake to view
the results in these cases as unusual or exceptional. Limited injunctive
relief was sufficient in these cases because trademark law's goals were
much more modest in the era in which they were decided. Specifically,
courts in these cases aimed only to prevent a competitor from dishonestly
diverting the mark owner's trade.". They therefore sought only to prevent
defendants from confusing consumers about the actual source of a
product. If all a defendant had to do was to distinguish itself sufficiently
to make clear that it was not the plaintiff, that did not necessarily require
robust injunctive relief, particularly in cases where some amount of
similarity could be explained by similarity in surname or use of a
descriptive or generic term. Indeed, close reading of many of these early
cases makes clear that the limited injunctive relief was more a natural
outgrowth of trademark law's limited goals than of special rules in
particular cases. In McLean v. Feming, 3 4 for example, the Court explained
that one merchant
cannot have [an exclusive] right, even in his own name, as against
another person of the same name, unless such other person uses a
form of stamp or label so like that used by the complaining party as
to represent that the goods of the former are of the latter's
manufacture. Nor will any other name, merely as such, confer any
such exclusive right, unless the name is printed in some particular
manner in a label of some peculiar characteristics, so that it
becomes, to some extent, identified with a particular kind of goods,
or when the name is used by the party, in connection with his place
of business, in such a manner that it assumes the character of a
trade-mark within the legal meaning of that term, and as such
~Id. at 544-45. In this respect, Brown Chemical Co. stands in similar relation to
Saxlehner as Kellogg Co. does to Singer Manufacturing Co.
"See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC, 360 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir.
2004) ("[O]ne's surname given at birth creates associations attached to that name
which identify the -individual. As a consequence, courts generally are hesitant to
afford strong protection to proper names, since to do so preempts others with the
same name from trading on their own reputation."); Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill
Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Societ6 Vinicole de
Champagne v. Mumm, 143 F.2d 240, 241 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[Tbo prohibit an individual
from using his true family surname is to 'take away his identity: without it he cannot
make known who he is to those who may wish to deal with him; and that is so grievous
anjnury that courts will avoid imposing it, if they possibly can.'")).
See generally, Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NoTRE DAME L. Rxv. 1839 (2007).
"96 U.S. 245 (1877).
Vol. 14:2542
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entitles the party to the protection of a court of equity, to prevent
others from infringing the proprietor's exclusive right. 3
Limited relief, in other words, reflected the fact that names were
unlikely to indicate a particular source, since consumers were likely to
know many merchants by the same name. But particular stylization of the
name, or of a label, could transform an ordinary name into a mark. The
relief was simply targeted at that incremental difference.
Trademark law obviously has come a long way since the traditional
era, and it no longer focuses narrowly on trade diversion. But I think
these cases still hold some important lessons for us-lessons that courts
have mostly ignored of late. In particular, these cases reflect a deep
appreciation for the competing interests at stake in many trademark
cases, and the limited relief courts ordered was intended to protect, as far
as possible, both parties' legitimate interests. I suggest that, even though
trademark law's goals are now much broader, courts could ameliorate
some of the consequences of trademark law's modern expansion by
showing similar willingness to shape injunctive relief.
II. MODERN COURTS' TENDENCY TO VIEW
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CRUDELY
36,
Notwithstanding their clear authority-and obligation-to do So,
courts have been quite reluctant of late to limit the scope of injunctive
relief, instead tending simply to enjoin the defendant's use without
qualification. There are, of course, some outliers 37 but generally
speaking courts have continued reasonably consistent practices of
entering limited injunctive relief only in cases involving generic terms,
surnames, and geographic terms. In other words, they have tended to
'5 Id. at 252-53.
'See, eg., Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d
Cir. 1997) ("It is well-settled that the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power to grant relief no broader than necessary to cure the effects of the harm
caused by the violation."); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958,
972 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The law requires that courts closely tailor injunctions to the
harm that they address.").
1See, e.g, Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1326-28
(2d Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's refusal to afford plaintiff relief for
defendant's use of "FORTIFLEX" for animal feed, as opposed to plaintiff's use of
"FORTIFLEX" for resin, and affirming narrowly drawn injunction with respect to
defendant's use of the mark for its container line which required defendant to use
the following disclaimer: "Not connected with Soltex Polymer Corporation of
Houston, Texas"); Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352, 354
(2d Cir. 1983) (upholding limited injunction crafted by district court which
prohibited the defendant from "using or adopting any hang tag. label or promotional
material that simulates, copies or creates a relationship to any label, hang tags, or
promotional materials used by Springs Mills," and from "adopting or using the
designation 'ULTRACASHMERE' in their trade dress, advertisements or promotional
literature, unless accompanied by a disclaimer").
20101 5 3
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continue the practice in those cases where the choice is, by and large,
between limited injunctive relief and no relief at all.
For example, in Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded American Veterans
Foundation,'3 the court found "Blinded Veterans" generic for non-profit
services designed to benefit blinded veterans. The defendant's use of
"blinded veterans" therefore could not be enjoined to prevent "confusion
generated by a mere similarity of names . 39 But the D.C. Circuit directed
the district court to determine whether the defendant was passing itself
off as the plaintiff and, if necessary, to enter injunctive relief sufficient to
distinguish the two organizations, perhaps by requiring a prominent
disclaimer alerting the public that the defendant was not the same
organization as, or associated with, the plaintiff40 Similarly, in E. & J.
Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,4 1 the court allowed Joseph Gallo to
continue using his surname on labels for his cheese products, but
required him to use the Gallo name in a non-trademark sense. The
court specifically suggested that the defendant could use 'Joseph Gallo
Farms" in small t"e below his trademark or 'Joseph Gallo" as a signature
in small type.",4  The Ninth Circuit's expressed its "reluctan lce] to
preclude an individual's business use of his own name, 4  but offered
limited relief on the ground Joseph Gallo "knew that the Winery would
object to his use of the GALLO name" and "intended to capitalize on
[the Winery's] reputation and selling power. 4 5
"872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
3Id. at 1045 (quoting Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d
934, 940 (7th Cir. 1986)).
40 Id. at 1047.
4" 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992).
42 Id. at 1297 ('Joseph may continue to explain to customers his participation in
his business, but not as a trademark or trade name that causes confusion."). As I have
explained elsewhere, determining whether a particular use is use as a trademark is
much less straightforward than the E. &J Gallo Winery court appeared to understand.
See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 773
(demonstrating that trademark use can only be determined by reference to consumer
understanding of the use, particularly consumer perception of whether a use
indicates source, sponsorship, or affiliation). And the final qualification in the . &J
Gallo Winery court's standard-that the use not cause confusion-makes this much
less than a firm rule on which parties can rely.
. &J Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1297.
"Id. at 1288 (citing Friend v. H.A. Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526, 531 (9th Cir.
1969)).
" E. &'J Gallo Winery, 967 F.2d at 1288. See also, Pacific Sunwear of California,
Inc. v. Kira Plastinina Style, Ltd., No. SACV 08-1141-JVS(ANx) (C.D. Cal. April 16,
2009), affid 2010 WL 358764 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2010) (enjoining defendants from using
"Kira" or "Kira Plastinina" as a trademark for apparel and accessories, but specifically
allowing defendants to "use the phrase 'Kima Plastinina' (but not the single word
'Kira') in written displays, advertisements, or Internet pages to identify the actual
designer of Defendants' goods, as opposed to identification of the company, business,
stores, goods, and services offered by Defendants," but requiring that "[~s]uch words
shall be in a noticeably smaller and less distinctive font and overall presentation than
any non-infringing words or marks used to identify Defendants' goods, services, or
544 Vol. 14:2
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Cases like Blinded Veterans Ass'n and E. &J Gallo Winery continue the
tradition of Kellogg Co. and Singer Manufacturing Co., training courts'
equitable powers on the core of trademark protection-the risk that one
party would divert a competitor's trade by passing itself off as the
competitor-while recognizing legitimate interests in using the contested
term. 4 6 Those cases involved very weak or unprotectable terms, so the
choice courts faced was between limited relief and no relief at all.
Broader willingness to employ equitable discretion would be reflected in
decisions in which courts could have enjoined the defendant's activities
altogether but settled for something less because limited relief was
sufficient to remedy any likelihood of confusion. Those cases, however,
are much harder to find in modern case law.
Indeed one has to go back to the well-known ANY Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats case 47to find a good example of this sort of use of discretion. In
Sleekcrafl the court found the defendant's use of "Sleekcraft" for its high
performance speed boats infringed AMF's rights in "Slickcraft," which it
used for its somewhat more middle-market speed boats .4 ' Nevertheless,
the court believed a limited injunction was warranted, both because the
parties' boats were targeted to different sub--markets 9 and because of
Sleekcraft's good faith, as evidenced by the steps it had voluntarily taken
to reduce the risk of confusion .5 Rather than enjoin all future use of the
"Sleekcraft" mark, the court directed the district court to consider both
parties' interests in structuring appropriate relief. "At minimum," the
court believed, "[the defendant's] logo should appear in all
business, and shall be accompanied by a disclaimer in a font of the same size and
design as that of the words 'Kira Plastinina' stating 'Kira Plastinina is not affiliated
with Pacific Sunwear of California,' or words to that effect. 'Kira' shall be in the same
typestyle as 'Plastinina' and in the same or smaller font size.").
46 See also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101-
02 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding "Murphy Bed" generic but affording limited relief
preventing defendant from using the term "original" in connection with its wall beds
on the ground consumers generally would associate "original" with Murphy (the first
company to manufacture such beds) and the defendant therefore was intentionally
passing off its products as Murphy's); King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (similarly finding "thermos" generic but prohibiting
the defendant from using the terms "genuine" or "original" in connection with its
thermos products).
17 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit's likelihood of confusion
factors are generally referred to as the Sleekcrafi factors, in reference to this case. See,
e.g., One Indus., LLC v. Jim O'Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009)
("To determine whether a 'likelihood of confusion' exists, we employ the eight factor
test set forth in AME Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats. . . ." (internal citation omitted)).
48599 F.2d at 354.
SThe court found the parties respective speed boats to be non-competitive but
closely related. Sleekcraft's boats were targeted to a somewhat different sub-market of
racing enthusiasts, though, as the court noted "[hi oth are for recreational boating on
bays and lakes. Both are designed for water skiing and speedy cruises. Their
functional features, for the most part, are also similar: fiberglass bodies, outboard
motors, and open seating for a handful of people." Id. at 350.
'0Id. at 354.
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advertisements, signs, and promotional materials prepared either by [the
defendant] or by his retail dealers, and on all [defendant's] business
forms except those intended for strictly internal use .",5 But the court
specifically declined to require a disclaimer of any association between
the ,arties' lines or to enjoin the defendant from expanding his product
line.
The court did something similar in the unique case of National
Football League v. Governor of Delaware.5 There the court held the state of
Delaware liable for running a lottery that was based on point spreads in
National Football League (NFL) games. The state did not use the NFL
name or any of its registered service marks to identify or advertise the
lottery games 5 but the court nevertheless believed that consumers would
believe the lottery was in some way associated with the NFL . Consumers
would be confused in this way, according to the court, because they
would understand use of city names on the betting cards as references to
particular NFL football teams, and "[a~pparently, in this day and age
when professional sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets,
drinking glasses and a wide range of other products, a substantial
number of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct
an enterprise of this kind without NFL approval . On this basis the
court felt compelled to issue some form of relief. But it was clearly uneasy
about the decision, and its trepidation showed in the remedy. Rather
than prohibit use of city names or enjoin the lottery games altogether,
the court entered a limited injunction "requiring the Lottery Director to
include on Scoreboard tickets, advertising and any other materials
prepared for public distribution a clear and conspicuous statement that
Scoreboard [was] 5not associated with or authorized by the National
Football League." 7
These cases are notable precisely because of their rarity-and
because one has to go back so far to find them. This is a shame, I think,
because courts lost their appetite for exercising their equitable discretion
at precisely the time trademark law was expanding and coming more
frequently into contact with competitive and free-speech interests.
Indeed, I can see at least four types of cases in which more careful use of
injunctive relief would help alleviate concerns of trademark over-
enforcement.
SId. at 355.
52 id,
435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
The lottery game was called 'Scoreboard" and the individual games were
"Touchdown" and "Touchdown ll." Id. at 1376.
" Id. at 1380.
'6Id. at 1381.
57 id,
546 Vol. 14:2
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111. BENEFITS OF A MORE NUANCED EQUITABLE APPROACH
A. Mixed Consumer Understandings
A variety of trademark cases involve marks that have different
meanings to significant groups of consumers. Descriptive terms, for
example, may have geographically limited secondary meaning, and
courts therefore have imposed geographic limitations on the scope of
injunctive relief in some cases involving unregi stered descriptive marks.
In Bank of Texas v. Commerce Southwest, Inc., for instance, the court
refused to issue county-wide injunctive relief against the defendant's use
of "BancTEXAS" because the plaintiff failed to prove the secondary
meaning of its Bank of Texas mark extended beyond the immediate
locale of its bank.5 Likewise in Buscemi's Inc. v. Anthony Buscemi
Delicatessen & Party Store, Inc.,64 the court refused to enjoin the
defendant's use in four of the seven counties in which plaintiff sought
injunctive relief because the Buscemi surname had developed secondary
meaning only in the other three counties . 6 ' And had it not determined
the defendant's use of "Fish Fry" was fair use, the court in Zatarains, Inc.
v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc!" seemed prepared to grant limited
injunctive relief to Zatarain's, whose descriptive "Fish Fri" mark had
acquired secondary meaning in the New Orleans area. In a similar vein,
courts have tied the scope of injunctive relief to the geographic reach of
secondary meaning in priority cases involving unregistered trademarks
used in geographically remote areas."
The meaning of a mark may also vary across groups of consumers
even when those consumers are all located in the same geographic area.
Cases involving allegedly generic terms or marks for which secondary
meaning is required bring these mixed meanings to the fore. In these
cases the outcome depends upon the "primary significance" of the
contested term to the relevant consuming public .6 ' And because the
5' 741 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1984).
51 Id. at 789.
6' 294 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
6" Id. at 219-20.
62 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
63 Id. at 795-96. I would not include in this category a case like Deere & Co. v.
MTh Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). The injunctive relief entered in that case
was geographically limited because the plaintiffs claim was based on New York's
statutory dilution provision. The court properly recognized that its decision was novel
and that the parties ights might well be different under different state legal regimes,
some of which contained no dilution provision at all. Id. at 46-47.
'4 See Nat'l Ass'n for Healthcare Commc'n, Inc. v. Cent. Arkansas Area Agency on
Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) (barring the plaintiff from using its
CareLink mark in the defendant's six-county trade area in central Arkansas).
'See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) ("The primary significance of the registered
mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for
determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or
services on or in connection with which it has been used."); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
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"primary" significance of a term is the meaning given to it by the majority
of consumers, a term is protectable if barely more than half of those who
encounter it regard it as a mark. This obviously leaves the remaining
consumers-in some cases nearly half of the relevant public-for whom
the term lacks source significance but whose understanding is ignored.
Thus, even in those cases where the court finds the mark protectable-
cases distinct from Blinded Veterans Ass'n, in which the court imposed
limited injunctive relief after finding the term was not protectable-
courts might do greater justice to the interests of those many consumers
who do not regard the term as a mark by limiting the scope of relief.
This problem of mixed consumer understanding is even more
pronounced at the likelihood-of-confusion stage, since courts have been
66
willing to enjoin uses that caused remarkably low levels of confusion. In
these cases the vast majority of consumers are not confused by the
defendant's use. Non-confused consumers derive no particular value
from an injunction and in fact may suffer harm from the inability to use
the term as they understand it. As Michael Grynberg argues, taking
seriously the interests of the non-confused consumers-who might
actually get affirmative information from the defendant's use-would
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (defining secondary meaning as existing
when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify
the source of the product rather than the product itself' (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.IlI (1982))); Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's Inc., 353 F.3d
528, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "the legal test of genericness is 'primary
significance'" and finding survey results showing sixty percent of respondents thought
"Beanies" was a brand name was evidence that the primary significance of "Beanies" is
still as the name of Ty's brand).
6' Courts generally articulate the relevant standard as a question of whether the
defendant's use is likely to cause confusion among "an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers." McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126,
1130 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A] n appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are
likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods...
(quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.
1978))); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship
Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Tjhe law has long
demanded a showing that the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood
of confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising
ordinary care."). While there is no absolute quantitative threshold for determining
what level of confusion is "appreciable," courts have generally been persuaded by
survey evidence showing fifteen percent confusion. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Tex.
Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a fifteen
percent level of confusion was strong evidence of likelihood of confusion); RJR
Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding a fifteen
to twenty percent level of confusion corroborates likelihood of confusion); James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 279 (7th Cir. 1976)
(finding a fifteen percent level of confusion was neither small nor de minimis). In
one case, the court called evidence of 8.5% confusion "strong evidence" of a
likelihood of confusion. Grotrian, Heliferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway
& Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modi~fied on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331
(2d Cir. 1975).
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entail modesty in crafting injunctive relief.6 But while I agree with
Grynberg that such modesty is needed most in cases at the "peripheries
of trademark law .. , where the argument for consumer harm is
tenuous," 68 think the principle is applicable across a broader range of
"traditional" trademark cases.
If the majority of consumers are not confused by a particular use,
simple changes to the format of the use-use of a house mark or a
stylized logo, for example-are likely to be sufficient to remedy any
confusion suffered by the distinct minority of consumers. Indeed we have
some empirical evidence that small changes can make a very large
difference in consumer perception. Studies indicate that, in the context
of competing goods, visual appearance is the primary cue for association
rather than the name attached to the product.6 This suggests that
confusion may frequently be mitigated simply by requiring the defendant
to alter the visual appearance of its products or the context in which
consumers encounter them. Limiting relief in this way would allow non-
confused consumers to continue to benefit from the information they
derive from the marks while adequately protecting confused consumers.
Moreover, small changes in the presentation of a mark can make a
large difference in the consequences for a brand owner. Several brand
extension studies have concluded that differentiating the extension
product from the parent brand by adding to or altering the stimulus is
effective in preventing any feedback effects on the parent brand. 0 One
study, for example, tested whether information about plans to offer
lower-priced models of luxury car brands (BMW and Acura) would
negatively affect subjects' perceptions of the luxury brands. Though the
authors did find some negative feedback when subjects were told only
that BMW (or Acura) was introducing a new car, the use of a sub-brand
name such as "Ultra by BMW" was sufficient to protect the parent brand
from any feedback effects . While subjects reacted negatively to the
lower-priced extension product, they did not change their perceptions of
the parent brands when the extension products were sub-branded. In
other words, even though they knew that BMW (Acura) was in fact the
72
source of the sub-branded extension product, subjects responded to the
67 Michael Grynberg, Trade-mark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
60, 111-13 (2008).
"' Id. at 112.
'See George Miaoulis & Nancy D'Amato, Consumer Confusion & Trademark
Infringement,' 42J. MARKETING, 48, 54 (1978).
7-see, eg., Amna Kirmani et al., The Ownership Effect in Consumer Responses to Brand
Line Stretches, 63 J. MARKETING 88 (1999).
"' Id. at 90-95.
71 Id. at 95. Rebecca Tushnet argues that this research regarding sub-branding
suggests that dilution by tarnishment is unlikely because "recognizing an absence of
affiliation should allow consumers to avoid penalizing the senior brand." Rebecca
Tushnet, Cone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV.
507, 543-44 (2008). But the research actually supports an even stronger point: The
parent brands in these studies were not diluted even when subjects believed the
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sub-branding strategy by sub-typing, effectively insulating the parent
brand from any feedback effects.
This research suggests that consumers are relatively adept at
recognizing attempts to differentiate and they are able to maintain
remarkably focused brand attitudes when encouraged to do so. So not
only is calibrating injunctive relief likely to deal better with the costs of
trademark protection, when it takes the form of requiring additional
signals of differentiation it is likely to prevent any real harm from
befalling the mark owner.
B. Sponsorship or Affiliation Confusion
More targeted injunctive relief would also be useful in cases now
regarded as "sponsorship or affiliation" cases. Mark Lemley and I have
argued that those cases need to be re-thought altogether, and that cases
involving confusion about responsibility for the quality of the defendant's
goods or services ought to be distinguished from cases involving
confusion of any other type.7 14 In the latter type of cases involving non-
quality-related confusion, we argue, claimants should have to
demonstrate that the confusion would be material to consumers'
purchasing decisions.
But materiality is a sliding scale, not an all-or-nothing inquiry, and
courts could plausibly find some conduct to be material to purchasing
decisions of only a few customers. In false advertising cases, the strength
of the materiality finding is related to the remedy; the more problematic
the deception, the more willing the courts are to act.6 This makes sense
as a matter of cost-benefit analysis; thinking about sponsorship cases in
these terms may permit courts to do the same sort of balancing of
remedies in sponsorship or affiliation cases, for example requiring
disclaimers as the cure for certain minor types of trademark harm.
0
extension products actually came from the same company. In other words, these
studies suggest that parent brands are not harmed when consumers have reasons to
differentiate whether or not consumers are confused about affiliation.
"See also Sandra J. Milberg et al., Managing Negative Feedback Effects Associated With
Brand Extensions: The Impact of Alternative Branding Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
119, 125 (1997) (sub-branding may prevent negatively evaluated extensions from
harming the parent brand). Laura Bradford suggests that these studies might not
adequately account for accrued wearout, which would take time to develop and
would not be captured by the responses to individual extension information in these
studies. See Laura A. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1276 (2008). Even if that is true, it has much more to do
with dilution by blurring than likelihood of confusion.
74Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. R~v. 413,
434 (2010).
75Id. at 416.
7See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565, 594-601 (2006).
1Cf. Grynberg, supra note 67, at 112 (calling for greater attention to the
interests of non-confused consumers as Well as confused ones).
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C. Merchandising Cases
A more refined approach to equitable relief also might offer a
78
middle ground on the controversial merchandising cases.
Merchandising cases involve the use of brands not to identify' the source
or quality of goods, but instead as desirable products in and of
themselves. The sale of brands qua brands on T-shirts, hats, and the like
presents difficult problems for trademark theory."9 There is no obvious
source relationship between, say, a university or a professional sports
team and T-shirts or hats that feature the logo of that university or team.
Consumers may at this point presume a franchising-type quality
relationship; universities and sports teams today do license the
manufacture of clothing featuring their logos, and it is possible that
consumers both assume that the mark owner is serving as a guarantor of
the quality of those clothes and that any clothing featuring the school or
team name is in fact licensed by the university and is therefore of the
assumed quality.
But those assumptions could be put to rest very easily without
disabling unaffiliated parties from selling merchandise bearing the
university or the franchise's logo. The vast majority of merchandise that
is officially licensed says so explicitly. At my own university, every piece of
licensed apparel bears a logo reflecting its status as an officially licensed
good." Sometimes these logos are affixed only to tags attached to the
goods, but the logos (or at least the words) could be incorporated
directly into virtually all of the licensed goods. To the extent a
university's real concern is with differentiating the officially licensed
merchandise from that which is not licensed,8 injunctive relief need not
prohibit use of the logos altogether. Courts could simply forbid
unlicensed sellers from saying their goods are "official" or "licensed," or
from using any kind of certification mark. Licensed manufacturers could
then easily communicate the status of their goods, thereby preventing
any confusion about sponsorship or affiliation, while leaving third parties
free to market unlicensed merchandise to consumers who do not care
about approval.
7This Section is adapted in part from Lemley & McKenna, supra note 74.
SSee Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 465, 471-73 (2005) (detailing these cases and
analyzing them under trademark principles); see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTruAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 755-58 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
'See University of Notre Dame, Licensing, http://licensing.nd.edu/policies/
(follow "labeling" and "holographic tags/stickers" hyperlinks).
"One suspects that is not the real, or at least not the complete, motivation.
Instead, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the universities simply want monopoly
control over merchandise bearing their names and logos.
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D. Protecting Speech Values
More refined equitable relief would also have significant benefits in
cases involving expressive works, many of which have been very difficult
for courts. Take for example Parks v. LaFace Records. 12 In that case Rosa
Parks objected to the band Olutast's use of her name as the title of a
song that repeatedly used the phrase "move to the back of the bus" in the
"hook" or chorus of the song. After rejecting two alternative approaches
to uses of trademarks in the title of works of authorship, the court
adopted the Rogers v. Grimaldi test." Under that test, use of a mark in a
title will be deemed infringing only if the use has "no artistic relevance to
the underlying work" or, if there is artistic relevance, the tidle "explicitly
misleads as to the source or the content of the work." 6
The Parks court adopted the Rogers v. Grimaldi approach because it
believed that approach best balanced the interest in avoiding consumer
87
confusion with that of free expression. And indeed the Rogers v. Grimaldi
test appears to be quite speech protective. Yet the Sixth Circuit in Parks
disagreed with the district court's determination that "the artistic
relationship between the title and the song was 'so obvious that the
8329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
SId. at 442.
One rejected approach was to simply rely on the likelihood-of-confusion
factors on the theory they will he sufficiently protective of speech interests because
consumers will not be confused by pure speech. Id. at 448. The court attributed this
approach to the Sixth Circuit case Fisch'~s Rests., Inc. v. Elly s Big Boy of Steubenville,
Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982), and inferred it from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("[l] t appears the Ninth Circuit will not adopt ... [a] test balancing
trademark protections against the artistic interest in protecting literary titles.... Dr.
Seuss strongly suggests that this 'balancing' has already been adequately accomplished
by the statutory framework [of the Lanham Act]."). "The Tenth Circuit has obliquely
endorsed [the Dr. Seuss] approach as well." Parks, 329 F.3d at 448. See Cardtoons, L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting
the "likelihood of confusion" test "serve [s] to avoid First Amendment concerns" in
trademark cases).
The second rejected approach was the "alternative avenues approach," which had
been endorsed by the Eighth Circuit. Parks, 329 F.3d at 448. Under that approach, "a
title of an expressive work will not be protected from a false advertising claim if there
are sufficient alternative means for an artist to convey his or her idea." Id.; see Mut. of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding creator of
parody T-shirts not protected by the First Amendment because he could still produce
parody editorials in books, magazines, or film); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line
Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding no First Amendment
protection for an infringing movie title because there were other titles the producers
could use); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding First Amendment protection not available to parodist because the confusing
trademark use was "wholly unnecessary" to the parodist's stated purpose).
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 999.
87 id.
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matter is not open to reasonable debate."' 8 For the Sixth Circuit, it was
clear the song was not about Rosa Parks, and it was unimpressed with
Outast's claim that the name had "symbolic" or "metaphorical"
89
significance . Whatever one's view of the specific result ini Parks, there
are good reasons to be concerned about the clarity of a rule when a
federal district courtjudge thinks artistic relevance is "so obvious that the
matter is not open to reasonable debate," 0 and a panel of the Sixth
Circuit finds essentially the opposite. The openness of this standard is
precisely what Bill McGeveran identified in many of the supposedly
speech protective doctrines in trademark law: they may lead courts to the
right result in most cases, but they are not predictable enough that
would-be users can rely on them.9
More limited remedies cannot alleviate this problem altogether, but
they could reduce the potential chill these vague rules create. If a
prospective user had some confidence that any relief entered against
them would be narrowly tailored to alleviating an implication of
endorsement or association, perhaps through a clear disclaimer rather
than absolute injunctive relief, she could proceed with much more
confidence. Specifically in the context of the Parks case, for example,
rather than enjoining use of Rosa Parks's name as the title of the Outast
song, the court could have required Outast to make clear its song was
92
not endorsed by Rosa Parks. This is not an optimal outcome, in my view,
since I would prefer that courts simply find uses like Outast's
categorically non-infringing. But better-tailored injunctive relief is a
second best solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Modern trademark law's excesses are well-documented, and there
are real costs associated with them. But some of trademark law's sharp
edges could be smoothed if courts would exercise their equitable powers
to shape injunctive relief. In a wide range of cases, limited injunctive
relief would be adequate to protect the legitimate interests of mark
owners and consumers. This is something courts once well understood,
and they would be wise to once again to take a page from this history.
" Parks, 329 F.3d at 452.
89 id.
SParks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 67-68
(2008).
92 See, e.g., Westchester Media Co. L.P. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-
97-3278, 2001 WL 34109374, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2001) (requiring the
defendant, if it chose to revive its POLO magazine, to use a disclaimer stating it was
"Not affiliated with Polo Ralph Lauren" in a prominent place, adjacent to and below
the magazine's title, in a white box with black border, set in legible black type no less
than one half the size of the POLO name, and no smaller than 16-point font).
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